Wednesday, August 27, 2014

A Note on Card Safety

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

There's been a lot in the news lately about malicious software invading stores' computer systems and stealing credit and debit card numbers.  A couple of people have asked me about how to be safe using credit and debit cards.  I wrote a big long piece about that.  After I read it, I decided it was mostly useless.  It can be boiled down to three rules:
  • Use your credit card sparingly,
  • Use your debit card almost not at all, and,
  • Check your accounts frequently.
Using your cards sparingly minimizes attack opportunity.  It is true that big, national organizations like Target and Neiman-Marcus have been infiltrated but it is also true that smaller organizations are often easier targets for the bad guys.  Each time you use that card, you potentially expose it to theft.  If you use a card for fast food or sundry purchases a dozen times a week, you've potentially exposed it a dozen times a week.  It really won't hurt you to carry some cash and make those small purchases with cash.  If you're worried about getting mugged, ask yourself how often that has happened and set the amount of cash accordingly.  If you're worried about losing your wallet, remember where you keep those credit cards!

I carry about a hundred dollars and pay for nearly every small purchase with cash.

If you decide to use a card, and you have a choice, use a credit card, not a debit card.  If you use a credit card and become the victim of fraud, it's the card company's money that's tied up.  If you use a debit card, it's your money that is gone.  A $5,000 fraud on a credit card is bad because you'll have to wrangle with the card company about whether you have to pay that fraudulent charge.  A $5,000 fraud on your debit card is much worse because it's your money, not theirs, that's been stolen.  You will probably eventually get most of it back, but while you are dealing with your bank, that money is not available to do things like by food or pay your mortgage.

I use my debit card in exactly two places: my bank's teller machine and a store that gives me a discount for debit but not credit.  So, those are my only two potential exposures to fraud.

Speaking of teller machines, there's a threat other than malicious software.  It's the "skimmer," a device that attaches to a teller machine or credit card reader like those on gas pumps.  The card gets read twice, once by the skimmer and once by the real device.  So, your transaction works, but the bad guys now have the numbers, too.  You guard against skimmers by using the same teller machines, gas pumps, etc. as often as possible and noticing what they look like.  If something looks funny when you visit, go elsewhere and then check with your bank.

If your card number is used for fraud, the sooner it's reported, the sooner it can be stopped.  Early detection lets you limit the damage.  These days, we can check our accounts on line in seconds.  You should check every account at least weekly, and your debit card account daily.  (If you have so many cards that would be hard, you have too many cards!)

Reduce opportunity for fraud by minimizing your use of cards and reduce your personal exposure by using credit cards, not debit cards.If fraud occurs, find it early by checking your statements regularly.

Copyright © 2014 by Bob Brown

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A Note on Card Safety by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Monday, June 23, 2014

Hack Your WiFi Password? Easy!

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

Using free WiFi?  Here's something to watch for: If you have a wireless router, you know you can set it up to broadcast any name you want. (Mine is "emorycottage.")

If you have service from AT&T or Comcast you know they're promoting their free WiFi hotspots like crazy.

Well, the Bad Guys have discovered this, and place wireless routers that broadcast names of "attwifi" or "xfinitywifi" in likely places. If your phone is set up to associate with such a hotspot automagically, it will connect to the evil hotspot.  If the attackers spoof a login screen, you could transmit your AT&T or Comcast password to the operators of the evil hotspot.  Even if there's no login, you're on a network you think you can trust, but you can't.

What to do? Don't allow your gear to connect automatically. Consider where you are if your gear asks for permission to connect, and never, ever use your carrier's WiFi password for anything else. Especially not for your email account, because if the Bad Guys can take over your email, they can probably reset your passwords for other accounts... like your bank.

Copyright © 2014 by Bob Brown

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Hack Your WiFi Password?  Easy! by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Tuesday, May 6, 2014

The IBM Model M Keyboard and Modern Computers

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

I love my IBM Model M "clicky" keyboard.  It has pounded out everything I've written for a quarter-century, including a master's thesis, a doctoral dissertation, thousands of reports, budgets, email messages, and even a small book.  What's so great about it?  The click!  There's a nice, satisfying click sound at the instant the key makes contact.  There's good tactile feedback, too.  You can feel when the key has made contact.  You don't have to bottom out each key press, and that means less effort when typing.  The letters are molded into the key caps, not painted on; the keys on my keyboard look as good today as they did a quarter-century ago.
Have I made you want one?  You can buy a brand-new Model M keyboard, made from the original IBM design, and even using the original IBM molds.  They're made by Unicomp in Lexington, Kentucky, USA using the original IBM equipment.  There's one specifically for Mac computers, too. They cost $80 to $120 plus shipping.

Not convinced that you should pay a hundred bucks for a keyboard?  It will make your life and work easier, and it'll last forever.  Computers may come and computers may go, but your Model M keyboard will go on and on.  Read what NPR's Martin Kaste has to say about it.

Using an Older Model M

If you're lucky, as I am, you have an original Model M keyboard.  You also have a problem; the keyboard has a PS/2 type plug, and modern computers do not have PS/2 sockets!  (New Model Ms from Unicomp come with a USB interface.)

You will need a PS/2 Keyboard To USB Adapter.  Cheaply made "bulge in the cable" adapters do not work.  Use the link to get the right thing.  (Disclosure:  Amazon pays me a few cents if you buy using the link.  I'm almost up to a dollar a month in commissions.)  You will probably also need short USB extension cable because the adapter is too fat to plug directly into many USB sockets.  Plug directly into the computer or into a powered USB hub; an unpowered hub will not work because of the power requirements of the keyboard.

Cleaning up that Model M

If you're like me, after a couple of decades enough glop has dropped into your keyboard to be truly disgusting.  The nice people at Unicomp will clean and thoroughly test your keyboard for $30 plus shipping.  Email them at for an RMA number.  When you have the RMA number, order a Class 1 keyboard repair and ship your keyboard off to them.  (They can do more extensive repairs in the unlikely event that you have a non-working keyboard, but it might be better just to buy a new one from them.)

Converting the Keyboard to USB

Some people, handy with soldering irons, have installed the USB adapter inside the keyboard case.  The idea is attractive to me because the adapter hanging from a cable on my laptop dock is un-aesthetic.  I haven't tried it, but it might not be hard to do.  A little time with Google should find some help.

Copyright © 2014 by Bob Brown

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The IBM Model M Keyboard and Modern Computers by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Friday, April 18, 2014

Virtualizing Windows XP

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

Well... this is revolting.  A slip of a finger erased a multi-page post.  I have tried to re-create it, but this is not the original post.

You followed my advice in The Four Choices of the Windows XPocalypse and you have a shiny new computer with a shiny new operating system.  It might be Windows 7, but it's more likely Windows 8.1.  It might even be Linux or MacOS.  Now you find out that one or more of your Windows XP applications won't run under your new operating system, and you really need it.  What to do?  What to do?

Well, you could haul out your old computer when you need it, and if it's a laptop, that might even be practical.  What you really want is all your stuff on one machine, where you can use it when you want to.

Windows 7's Virtual XP Mode

Windows 7 includes a virtual XP mode that will let you run your XP programs under Windows 7.  You will have to reinstall your XP applications and any files they might need.

There is no XP mode in Windows 8, nor in Linux or MacOS, so it's not a long-term solution, and may not even work for you now.  Even if you have Windows 7 and your install media, your Windows XP setup may be so complex that replicating it under Windows 7 isn't practical.

Virtualizing Windows XP

A "virtual machine" is a software package that simulates actual computer hardware.  For helping XP live on, the virtual  machine software runs on your new computer, and Windows XP runs on the virtual machine.   There is software that's free for personal use that'll do this.  The exception is MacOS, where you will need a $60 software package.

You will need your Windows XP computer, with it's disk intact.  You'll also need an external hard disk at least as big as the Windows XP disk and virtualization software, which is free for most personal applications.  You may also need a new license and product key for Windows XP.  There's more on that below.

Creating the Windows XP Virtual Image

 If you bought your Windows XP computer with XP pre-installed, please read About the Windows XP Product Key below before you start this process.  If you're not sure whether your XP system has one of those OEM keys, you can try this process and See What Happens™.  The worst that can happen is that you'll have to do it again after you change the product key.

You make a virtual machine from your running Windows XP computer  by running the VMWare vCenter Standalone Converter.  It's free from VMWare, but you have to register to get it.  The longer XP goes unpatched, the more dangerous it is to connect it to the Internet.  I downloaded the converter (and all the other software I used for this project) using my new system and moved it over with a flash drive.

Install the vCenter Converter on your running XP system and run it.  Direct the output to your external disk, which should be empty.  (If it's not, format it.  Use the "quick format" option.)  This will take several hours – mine took about four – so best to plan to run it over night.

When the converter has finished, shut XP down, move the external drive to your new system, and go to Running Your Virtual Machine below.

About the Windows XP Product Key

Microsoft sold licenses for Windows XP to computer manufacturers at a steep discount. The catch is that the license is "locked" to the specific configuration of your XP computer. Such a license is called an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) license, and it will not run under a virtual machine.  If you try it, you'll get an "activation required" screen during the startup process of the virtual machine.

There is no way I know of to get past the activation screen.  Putting in a new product key doesn't work, and calling the phone number on the screen connects you to a robot with no sympathy for your plight.  You have to change the product key before you virtualize the XP system.

Getting a New Product Key: You will (probably) need a product key that matches the version of XP you have.  So, if you have XP Home Edition, you'll need an XP Home product key; if you have XP Professional, you'll need an XP Pro product key.  There are two kinds of licenses and product keys that will work, retail licenses and volume licenses.  If you ever bought, but did not use, a copy of Windows XP, you own a retail license, and the package will have the product key you need.  If you can find it.  Retail licenses for XP are for sale on eBay at prices ranging from $20 to over $100.  Expect prices to go up as these become rarer.

You may be able to talk the I.T. people where you work into giving you a product key for a volume license of XP.  (Remember, though, the VMWare software is free only for personal use; if you're doing this for work, you'll need VMWare licenses.) Educational licenses for XP are not locked to particular hardware, so you can use an education license if you have one.

I am told that one can find product keys that will work through searching the web.  I haven't tried that.  You shouldn't, either, because it's probably illegal.  (In the words of the late Jay Rosenberg, I have been politic and you have been warned.)

Cloning the XP System:  This step is optional.  Because I am conservative and risk-averse, I used the free edition of Macrium Reflect to make a clone of my XP system disk.  I booted from the cloned disk and changed the product key there.  My thinking was that if I somehow rendered the working disk unbootable, I'd still have the original.  That step took several hours and turned out not to be necessary for me.  (Although the free edition will do everything you need to do for this step, the folks at Macrium Software have done everyone a service by making it available.  Consider buying the licensed edition if you can afford it.)

Changing the Product Key: To change the product key of a running XP system, you will need the Windows XP Product Key Tool, still available (so far) from Microsoft.  Download it, run it, and type in the new product key.  You will probably have to reboot your computer, but it either will not need activation, or will activate over the Internet without trouble.  (If it doesn't, you'll be glad you made that clone disk!)

Once your XP system has a retail or volume license product key, you can return to Creating the Windows XP Virtual Image.

Running Your Virtual Machine

You use the free VMWare Player to run your virtual machine on Windows or Linux.   For MacOS, you will need VMWare Fusion, which costs $60.  There's a free 30-day trial of VMWare Fusion, so you can be sure this works for you before you put your money down.  Download and install the correct virtual machine software for your computer.

Connect the disk with the XP virtual machine image on it and double-click the dot-vmx file; Windows XP will start and run in your virtual machine!  (If you get the dreaded "activation required" screen, you will need a different product key.  See About the Windows XP Product Key above.  As far as I know, there's no way to get past the activation screen.  You will need to rebuild the virtual machine image with a retail or volume license product key.)

After you have Windows XP running, you will want to install the VMWare tools into the virtual machine.   There will be a button below the virtual machine screen that will start the process for you.  It takes two or three minutes.

You also need to read what Byron Brewer has to say about very slow shutdowns of VMWare virtual machines. I added the four-line change suggested by Brewer directly to the dot-vmx file by editing it with Notepad.

Use "msconfig" and "Add/Remove Programs" to get rid of things that start automatically.  They will make opening your virtual machine very slow, and may engage in unwanted Internet access.

It is an increasingly bad idea to use your XP virtual machine for anything having to do with Internet access.  Most especially you should not use Internet Explorer.  XP is limited to IE 8, and web browsers are a primary vector for malicious software.  Also avoid Flash, Java, and Acrobat in web browsers.  Best advice: No Internet access from that virtual machine.  You might even want to delete IE 8, Flash, Java, and Acrobat.

If all you do is look at stuff on your virtual machine, you probably don't need to worry about the virtual disk, except to back it up from time to time.  If you are writing to the disk as well as reading, you will want to read what VMWare has to say about compacting virtual disks.  Make a backup before you compact.

Copyright © 2014 by Bob Brown

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Virtualizing Windows XP by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Saturday, April 12, 2014

The Four Choices of the Windows XPocalypse

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

It's April, 2014, and Windows XP is dead.  Although XP has its detractors, it has served us very well for a dozen years.  It's unfortunate that Windows Vista was, or was perceived to be, such a dud.  It was possible to upgrade in place from XP to Vista, and more people would have done it if Vista hadn't gotten such a bad rap.  It did, and they didn't.

Now what?

There are four possibilities:
I've fully tried the last three three of them, and am messing around with the "Keep on with XP" option.  I'll write a little bit about my experience with each one, but first a recommendation: Buy a new computer and get a new operating system.

There is actually a fifth choice: run Windows XP as a virtual machine on your new computer.  That's the subject of a separate blog post, Virtualizing Windows XP.

This article tells what to do, but not so much about how to do it.  None of this stuff is hard, but you might want to have a techie friend work with you through whichever option you choose.

One other thing: to accomplish either of the latter two possibilities, you will need an external disk drive, which will cost you $90 to $150.  You really need one of these anyway so you can back up your data.

Keep on With Windows XP

I can't really recommend this one.  Eventually, some bad guy will find a serious flaw in Windows XP and Microsoft won't fix it.  Do you care?  Yes, you do!  Operating system flaws put your data at risk.  Irreplaceable photographs could be deleted or corrupted.  If your web browser knows your banking password, or something equally important, the bad guys could get it.  They could send spam through your computer or mount attacks on others from your computer.

With that said, Windows XP did not turn into a pumpkin on April 8, and no hard drives exploded.  If you're a little careful, you could get several more years out of Windows XP.  How do you be careful?

Run Windows Update:  Microsoft released security patches for WinXP on April 8.  Be sure you've got them by running Windows update. If you had automatic updates turned on, you should already have the latest updates, but it won't hurt to check.  If you had automatic updates off, keep running the update process until it tells you there are no updates.  Do this now, in case Microsoft removes the XP updates from their servers.

Dump Internet Explorer:  The latest versions of Internet Explorer will not run on XP; we're stuck with IE 8, which is not being updated any more, and the web browser is the entry point for a lot of malicious software.  The most current versions of Firefox and Chrome work on XP.  Get one or both.  Do not use IE 8 for anything.  At all.

Don't be "Administrator:"  Many of us, myself included, were in the habit of using a login account with Administrator privileges. The trouble with that is, if malicious software finds its way into your computer, it will have administrative privileges, which means it can do great damage.  Make a new account, like "Bob Brown Adm" and give it administrative privileges.  Change your regular account to have limited privileges, and use that one unless you really need to administer something.

Disable Java and Flash in the Browser:  These are major entrances for malicious software, and if they're enabled, they will run automatically if you reach an infected site.  By the time you know there's a problem, it will be too late.

Run Anti Virus Software:  Although your operating system won't be updated when new security flaws are found, your anti-virus program may be able to defend you from some of them.  If you are already running Microsoft Security Essentials, Microsoft has promised updates through July, 2015.  If you don't already have an anti-virus product and need something free, try Avast! 2014.  My recommendations for paid products are those from Kaspersky or F-Secure.  Don't try to run more than one A-V product on the same computer.  They don't work or play well together.

Keep your other Applications Up to Date:  The operating system is not the only thing bad guys can attack.  If you are running other applications, keep them up to date.  Software makers may keep publishing updates, especially security updates, for their Windows XP applications for some time after Microsoft support has ended.  If there are updates, get them, regularly!  Secuinia PSI will help you find out what applications need updating and help you get the updates.

Have Good Backups:  You should be doing this anyway.  The most valuable part of your computer is generally your data.  You'll need an external drive and backup software, or one of the cloud backup services.  I like the external drive approach because it's under my control.  Power off that backup drive when you're not actually making backups, or malicious software could infect it, too. 

Stay Away from Public Networks:  If you are at home or at work, you're almost certainly connected to the Internet through a network address translation (NAT) device.  It's not really a firewall, but it does protect your computer from unsolicited network packets.  A public network could assign a registered address to your computer, which would expose it to the Internet with no protection at all.  It's not likely, but it could happen.  You have to worry about the network operator and whoever else may be on the same network, too.

Buy a New Computer, Get a New OS

This is the path of least resistance, although not the path of least money.  It's not as expensive as you might fear, though.  Buying Windows 8.1 will cost you over $100 unless you are eligible for an education discount, and you can buy a new computer with Windows 8.1 pre-installed for less than $400.  (That's a pretty minimalist computer, but you can get one that's highly capable and still be in the three-figure price range.)

You can save your data, most of it automagically, but you will have to re-install your apps.

Transfer Your Data:  With both computers connected to the same network, install the (free from Microsoft) PC Mover Express software on both computers.  If possible, use a wired network; this may take forever if you try to do it wirelessly.  Laplink has a special Ethernet cable for $10 if you don't have a wired network available.  (By the time you add shipping, it's $22, though.)  Order it when you order the new computer, and you'll have it when you need it.  (You might be able to use an Ethernet crossover cable if you have one around.  I haven't tried this.)

Follow the directions and PC Mover Express will migrate all your data, including most application settings, to your new PC.  Plan to do this over night as it could take many hours.  When I did this, it found everything except my Lotus Notes files and the profile for the Firefox web browser.  The free MozBackup program will save and restore your Firefox profile and those of other Mozilla products, like Thunderbird.

Buy and Install Start8:  The Start8 program ($5.00) restores the start button to Windows 8.1.  Microsoft has promised to put the start button back in a later release, so you may not need Start8.  Or, you may be happy with Microsoft's "start screen" and not need Start8.

Reinstall Your Applications: You will need to reinstall you applications from the original CDs or DVDs.  If you've downloaded free software for XP, you 'll have to download it again.  And, some old software may not work with Windows 8.1.

Put the Old PC in a Closet:  Once you have everything like you want it, put the old PC in a closet for six months or so.  If you find there's something you need from it, you can haul it out, fire it up, and copy what you need to a flash drive.  If you don't discover that you need anything in that six months, you probably got everything when you copied the data.

Finally, Nuke the Old Disk:  When you are confident that you no longer need anything from the old PC, destroy any data that may be on the disk.  This is a critical step, especially if you've saved passwords in your web browser, stored credit card numbers, or otherwise put sensitive data on there.  Darik's Boot and Nuke is a free program for secure erasure of disks.  Download the image file, burn it to a CD or DVD, and boot the old computer from the CD.  Be careful with this!  It will completely erase the disk(s) in any computer from which you boot it.

Once you've done the boot-and-nuke operation, there will be nothing on the disk of the old PC, including the operating system.  You can now recycle it, donate it, or (try to) sell it.  Do not have high hopes for selling it, though.  It might bring enough to buy a lunch.

Or, you could install Linux on the old PC and keep it as a spare or donate it to a church or school.  Installing Linux will effectively wipe any previous data.  If you want to be especially cautious, run boot-and-nuke first.

Back Up Everything and Upgrade the Operating System

You want to keep your own hardware, but run a newer operating system.  You first have to find out whether your hardware will support Windows 8.1 because you can't buy Windows 7 any more.  If you are unsure whether your system meets the specifications, you can download the "Upgrade Assistant" from that link and it'll tell you.  You will need to know whether your computer has an x86 or x64 CPU to know which flavor of Windows 8.1 to buy.  Do note that a copy of Windows 8.1 will cost you $100 or more unless you can get an education discount.  You will want to think about buying a new PC or dumping Windows in favor of Linux.

You will be able to back up and transfer your data files, but you'll have to reinstall your applications, and some of them may not work under Windows 8.1

OK... you've decided to go ahead...

Back Up Everything: You are going to blow your installation of Windows XP completely away when you install Windows 8.1.  If you have anything at all on your XP computer that you want to keep, copy those files to an external disk before you start to install Windows 8.1; otherwise, they'll be gone forever!  Remember, this applies to pictures, documents, movies, etc.  You cannot use your Windows XP applications under Windows 8.1.

Install the Operating System:  Install Windows 8.1 from the DVD you got when you bought the operating system.  When you're done, you will have a bootable computer with nothing on it except the OS and a few applications that came with it.

Buy and Install Start8:  The Start8 program ($5.00) restores the start button to Windows 8.1.  Microsoft has promised to put the start button back in a later release, so you may not need Start8.  Or, you may be happy with Microsoft's "start screen" and not need Start8.

Reinstall Your Applications: You will need to reinstall you applications from the original CDs or DVDs.  If you've downloaded free software for XP, you 'll have to download it again.  And, some old software may not work with Windows 8.1.

Restore Your Data Files:  Attach the external disk to the computer and copy the data files from your backup to their new home.  The structure of Windows 8.1 is different from that of XP.  You may want to explore around a bit before you start copying the files.

You will want to hang on to that external disk for a while before you write over it in case you missed getting something off of it.  (If you missed putting something on it, it's gone forever!)

Dump Windows and Use Linux

If your computer is not up to running Windows 8.1 and you mostly use it for surfing the web and using web-enabled email, you can run Linux and be happy.  You can even do a little word processing or maybe watch a DVD using Linux.  Your WinXP "apps" will be gone, though, along with WinXP.

Don't listen to people who tell you that Linux is only for techies.  You will find modern Linux distributions very similar to what you're used to.

Back Up Everything: You are going to blow your installation of Windows XP completely away when you do this.  If you have anything at all on your XP computer that you want to keep, copy those files to an external disk before you start to install Linux; otherwise, they'll be gone forever!  Remember, this applies to pictures, documents, movies, etc.  You cannot use your Windows XP applications under Linux.

Get Lubuntu Linux:  Lubuntu is a lightweight edition of the Ubuntu Linux distribution.  Download it using your Windows XP machine and make a bootable flash drive.  You will need to know whether you have an x86 processor or an x64 processor.  Once you have that bootable flash drive, you're done with XP!  Boot from the flash drive (you may have to play with the BIOS boot options to do that) and you will install Lubuntu Linux.

You will do the following steps after you are running Linux.  There is an enormous amount of software for Linux.  Some is for generic Linux distributions and some is specific to a particular distribution.  If you can't find a package specifically for Lubuntu, use the Ubuntu version or the generic version.

Install a Browser:  Lubuntu comes with Firefox pre-installed.  If you prefer, you can install Chrome.  When you have Lubuntu running, use Firefox to do a search for "Chrome Linux" and you'll be good to go.  (I didn't put a link in here because it won't do you any good until you're already running Lubuntu.)

Install Libre Office:  Libre Office is a cross-platform office suite with many of the features of Microsoft Office.  The best feature is that it's free!

Install VLC:  The VLC media player is also free and works with Linux.  If you have a suitable sound card, you can use VLC to listen to music.  You may even be able to watch DVDs, depending on your hardware.

Copyright © 2014 by Bob Brown

Creative Commons License
The Four Choices of the Windows XPocalypse by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

A Little About Encryption

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White

This is the third of three posts on encrypting email.  The others are It's Time to Encrypt Your Email and Using Encrypted Email

About Encryption

Encryption mathematically scrambles the bits of your email messages or other documents so that the content is impossible to read without reversing the encryption process.  The encrypting process combines a long and random collection of bits called the key with the message to to produce an encrypted message, called the cipher text.  This is analogous to putting the message in an envelope, except that the envelope cannot be opened without the key.  The cipher text can be safely sent to the recipient electronically; even if the message is intercepted, the adversary will not be able to read it. Decrypting the message involves reversing the process using the same key, as shown in the diagram.  A system of encryption that uses the same key for both encrypting and decrypting is called secret key or or shared key or symmetric key encryption.

You've spotted the problem!  Sender and recipient must each have a copy of the key, so you have to figure out a way to get the key to your recipients securely and hope they keep it secure.  You also have to have a separate key for each person with whom you want to correspond; otherwise, all will be able to decrypt everyone else's messages.  Symmetric key encryption has important uses as we see below, but for correspondence, it doesn't scale well when used by itself.

Public Key Cryptography

In the 1970s, three groups of researchers independently invented a mechanism that uses two different keys with the same message, one to encrypt and one to decrypt.  The key usually used for encrypting is called the public key, and the key usually used for decrypting is called the private key.  Here's what's important:  a message encrypted with one's public key can only be decrypted using the corresponding private key.  You can give the public key to anyone, and they will not be able to decrypt messages that others may have encrypted with the same public key.

You can give your public key to everyone with whom you correspond.  Only you will be able to decrypt the messages they encrypt for you.  In fact, there are public key servers that will allow you to post your own public key and to look up the public keys of others.  One such key server is  You will probably want to upload your public key to that one or another.  You could try looking up the public keys of others right now by clicking on the link.

Hybrid Cryptography

There's a problem with public key cryptography: it's a lot of computational work.  Encryption using public key cryptography can take as much as 10,000 times longer than encrypting the same message using symmetric key cryptography.  Encrypting a message could take from several minutes to hours.  We probably don't want to wait even a few minutes for the encryption process.

Symmetric (shared) key encryption is much faster, with times in seconds for even very long messages.  But, as we saw earlier, the problem is how to get a copy of that shared key securely to the recipient.  The solution is to use public key cryptography to solve the key exchange problem.  The sender generates a random number that's used to create a key for symmetric key encryption, using something like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES.)  So, encryption can be completed very quickly.  The symmetric key is called a session key when used this way because each key is used for only one message or communication session.  The session key itself is encrypted using public key cryptography and the recipient's public key.  Because the session key is short – perhaps 256 bits (32 bytes) – the time to encrypt it is minimal.  The encrypted message and encrypted session key are packaged together and transmitted to the recipient.  This two-step process is called hybrid cryptography, and is almost always the way public key cryptography is employed to secure messages from eavesdropping.

The recipient reverses the process.  The session key is first decrypted using the recipient's private key.  Then, the session key is used to decrypt the message.  Besides speeding up the process, use of session keys and hybrid cryptography actually improves the security of messages because it deprives an adversary of the chance to collect many messages encrypted with the same key.  That's important for two reasons: having a large collection of text encrypted with a single key may make the cryptanalyst's job easier, and, if the key for one message is cracked, all the messages are revealed.  (Of course, if the cryptanalyst can recover the recipient's private key, the public key no longer offers security.  But, if the cryptanalyst cracks one session key, the other messages remain secure because they were encrypted with different session keys.)

Idea: A Digital Signature

The two keys of a public key crypto key pair are cryptographic inverses of one another.  A message encrypted with one key of a pair can only be decrypted with the other key of the same pair.  In the normal course of things, Alice would encrypt a message using Bob's public key, and Bob would decrypt it with his private key.  That would keep the message confidential while it travels over an unsecure channel.

If Alice encrypts a message with her private key, Bob or anyone else could decrypt it using Alice's public key.  There's no confidentiality because the message can be decrypted with Alice's public key, and that's, well, public.  However, if we believe that Alice has guarded her private key carefully, only she could have encrypted the message. So, we can say that Alice has digitally signed a message that was encrypted with her private key.

Encrypting a message with a private key (to sign it) has the same problem as encrypting with a public key to secure it, namely that it would take a very long time.  We need a way to characterize a specific message that is shorter than the message itself.

Cryptographic Hashes

In the early days of computing, it was common to add up a series of numbers before entering data into a computer, then add them up again with the computer.  If one got the same total, that was a good indication that the data entry process was free of errors.  Sometimes the numbers were things like birth dates, where a total did not have any meaning other than as a check for consistency.  Such totals were called "hash totals."

The characters that comprise a computer message are just numbers.  In theory, we could add them up to get a hash total that could serve as a consistency check on the message. In practice, it's a little more complicated. 

A cryptographic hash function has three special properties.  First, even a tiny change in a message, like adding a zero to make $100 into $1,000, must change the computed hash code.  Second, it should be impossible, given a message, to create another message that produces the same hash code.  There exist hash codes that are thought to meet both criteria.  We can think of the computed hash code as a kind of fingerprint for a message.  Different messages always have different fingerprints, even if the difference in the messages is very small.  A hash code computed over a message is called a message digest.

The third property is that one cannot reconstruct the message given only the message digest.That's important because the digital signature exposes the message digest to an adversary.

The Digital Signature Improved

Given that we can compute a cryptographic hash, we can improve upon our idea of a digital signature.  Instead of encrypting the entire message with her private key to sign it, Alice can compute a cryptographic hash over the message and encrypt the hash code only using her private key.  Since the hash code is short – perhaps 256 bits – it, like a session key, can be encrypted quickly even with public key cryptography.  The encrypted hash code is sent along with the message to serve as the digital signature.

Such a digital signature not only authenticates the sender, it protects the message from tampering while in transit.  Here's why: Anyone can decrypt the digital signature using Alice's public key, but only Alice could have encrypted it.  Bob can verify the message by computing the hash code anew, then comparing it with the decrypted hash code sent with the message.  If they're equal, we can be sure the message actually came from Alice.  We can also be sure the message hasn't been altered.  If Evil Eve had altered the message, the hash code Bob computed would  be different from the one Alice computed.  The computed hash code wouldn't match the decrypted hash code, and the digital signature validation would fail.  (Eve can't replace the hash code after altering the message because doing so requires Alice's private key, which only Alice has.)

Putting the Pieces Together

We can encrypt a message using hybrid cryptography, and we can authenticate it using a digital signature.  If we put those pieces together, we can package a message that only the intended recipient can decrypt, and for which the authenticity of the sender is assured.

The diagram below shows what happens when Alice's encryption software prepares a digitally-signed and encrypted message for transmission to Bill.  Plain text (unencrypted) information is represented by green boxes, encrypted information by red boxes, and keys by orange boxes.  The package of information that is transmitted to Bill is surrounded by a blue box.  The digital signature is "sort of green" because, although it is encrypted, anyone can decrypt it using Alice's public key.The circle-plus symbol indicates encryption.

Alice's encryption program uses a cryptographic hash algorithm to compute a message digest of the plaintext message, then encrypts the message digest using Alice's private key to form the digital signature.  A random number generator is used to produce a session key.  The session key will be used only once, for this message.

The plaintext message is encrypted using the session key and a symmetric key encryption algorithm such as AES.  The session key itself is encrypted with Bill's public key.

There are three encryption operations.  Symmetric key encryption is used for the "main" message because it is comparatively fast.  Public key encryption is used to produce the encrypted session key and the digital signature.  This works because, although public key encryption is slow, both the message digest and the session key are small, perhaps 32 bytes each.  The "package" sent to Bill includes the three main components shown in the diagram and some additional information.  It identifies Alice as the sender, Bill as the recipient, and names the encryption algorithms used.  It is possible to include more than one encrypted session key.  If Alice wanted to send the same message to both Bill and Charlie, the package would include a copy of the session key encrypted with Bill's public key and another copy encrypted with Charlie's public key.

Bill Receives the Message

Bill gets the packaged message over the Internet by email, or perhaps in some other way. The session key was encrypted by Alice using Bill's public key.  Using Bill's private key, Bill's crypto program decrypts the session key.  The session key is used to decrypt the actual contents of the message.  Since only Bill has a copy of his private key, only Bill can decrypt the session key, and hence decrypt the message.  The message is now available in plaintext.  The next step is to check that it really came from Alice and is not a forgery.

Alice digitally signed the message by encrypting a message digest using her private key.  We know two things about that.  Since the digest was encrypted with Alice's private key, only Alice's public key can decrypt it.  Since only Alice has a copy of her private key, only Alice could have encrypted it.

Bill uses Alice's public key to decrypt the digest that is the digital signature.  Bill also computes a new message digest from the plaintext message.  The decrypted digest and the computed digest are compared.  If they are equal, Bill has confidence that the message actually came from Alice, and also that it hasn't been tampered with.  If they're not equal, then something is wrong and Bill must mistrust the message.

The amount of confidence Bill has in the authenticity of the message depends on the amount of confidence Bill has that Alice has kept her private key secure.  If Bill is sure that Alice has kept her private key secure, then Bill can be sure the message came from Alice.  If malicious Mallory has gotten a copy of Alice's private key, then Mallory could have forged the message.

Notice that if Eve the eavesdropper can intercept a copy of the message, Eve can decrypt the digital signature with Alice's public key because it is, well, public.  However, it doesn't do Eve any good because one of the characteristics of that cryptographic hash is that the message cannot be reconstructed from the message digest.

Digital Certificates

In a previous post, I wrote about signing others' public keys as a way to improve our confidence that the key actually belongs to the person it claims to belong to. We saw earlier how a message could be both authenticated and protected from tampering through the use of a digital signature.  A public key can be protected in the same way.  When a public key is digitally signed, the result is called a digital certificate

The purpose of a digital certificate is to bind an identity to a public key.  When you created your public/private key pair, you put in your own email address, but you could have claimed to be or even  If you could get someone to use such a public key, thinking they were corresponding with the real Alice (or President) you'd be able to decrypt the messages because you have the corresponding private key.  A digital certificate helps us increase our confidence that a particular public key actually belongs to the claimed party.  It binds an identity to a public key.
The diagram at the left is a simplified representation of a digital certificate.  The part in green is all plain text.  It identifies as being the owner of the given public key.  This certificate has two digital signatures, one by Bob and one by Charlie.  By signing this certificate, Bob and Charlie are certifying that they have checked that the given public key actually belongs to

Here's how it works.  The certificate is just a message consisting of an identifier, a public key, and other information in plain text, the part shown as green in the diagram.  Each signature has two parts, identification of the signer, shown in yellow-green and stored as plain text, and an encrypted hash code, shown in red and encrypted with Bob's private key.  Someone who knows and trusts Bob can compute the hash code directly, using the part of the certificate shown in green, than use Bob's public key to decrypt the part shown in red under Bob's identifier.  If the computed hash code and the decrypted hash code match, we can have confidence that the part of the certificate in green hasn't been tampered with, and that the public key given really does belong to Alice.  How much confidence we have depends upon how much we trust Bob.  If we don't know or trust Bob, perhaps we know Charlie or someone else who has signed Alice's key.  The subject of trust was discussed in Using Encrypted Email.

A digital certificate can be signed by a number of individuals, creating a web of trust, or by a single trusted organization, called a certificate authority.  OpenPGP uses the web of trust model.

A Note on the Strength of Cryptography

Modern cryptosystems are very difficult to break, but probably not impossible to break.  If you used a 4,096-bit key size when you generated your key pair, cracking your encryption would take dozens of years using the best algorithms and fastest computers available.  Of course, Moore's law means that computers are getting faster, and in a dozen years, 4,096 bits may not be enough.  For now, even with a 2,048 bit key size, you are probably safe from any person or agency except possibly the NSA.

The weak points are the private key, stored on your computer and the passphrase, stored in your head. If an adversary can get both of those, your privacy is toast.  Without them , your privacy is protected against casual snoopers, and even persistent snoops like reporters.  You are in more danger from something like this than you are from a computational attack. Your private key backup is another weak point.  Guard it carefully.

While we're talking about the strength of cryptography it's time for a warning: don't roll your own.  While it might seem very cool to design and implement your own cryptosystem, it turns out to be surprisingly hard to do right.  Unless you have the equivalent of a Ph.D. in mathematics with an emphasis on cryptology, it's an extremely bad idea to trust important information to home brewed crypto.  Experiment all you want, but when you're serious about protecting information, use cryptosystems developed by experts, examined by other experts, and that have withstood the test of time.

Cryptography and the Law

There's a different question when it comes to law enforcement: can you be compelled to decrypt documents?  Even if law enforcement agencies cannot crack your encryption, they may be able to get a court to order you to decrypt documents yourself or to surrender your passphrase.  If you refuse, you might be held in jail until you change your mind.  Whether the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination means you do not have to reveal your passphrase or the contents of encrypted documents has not been settled as of summer, 2013.  Different courts have ruled differently.  There is also a distinction at law between being forced to divulge your passphrase and being forced to produce documents in plain text (decrypted) form.

I'm not a lawyer, and cannot give legal advice.  Good, common sense advice is not to do illegal things nor possess illegal materials.  Encryption may delay an investigation, but it is unlikely to save you from the consequences of illegal actions.

With that said, I cannot emphasize too strongly that, in the United States, there is nothing illegal about using encryption. 

Previous article: Using Encrypted Email

Copyright © 2013 by Bob Brown

Creative Commons License
A Little About Encryption by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

Some of the symbols used in some of the illustrations were borrowed from a document on the subject of public key cryptography by Microsoft. Thanks, Microsoft!  The XKCD cartoons are used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License.The quotation by Ken White is used by permission.

Using Encrypted Email

My people have no tradition of proofreading.  —Ken White
This is the second of three posts on encrypting email.  The others are It's Time to Encrypt Your Email and A Little About Encryption
If you've followed the directions in "It's Time to Encrypt Your Email," you have an email client that's set up to encrypt messages you send and decrypt messages you receive.  Now what?

Someone To Write To

Being the first person on your block to have public key cryptography for your email leaves you with no one with whom you can correspond securely. Let your frequent correspondents know about these articles and help them get started with public key cryptography for their email.  If you recruit two people to use encryption and each of them also recruits two more, soon everyone will be doing what we should be doing.

The Subject is Not Encrypted

OpenPGP and Enigmail  follow Internet standards, and those standards don't provide for encrypting the "header" information of email messages, including the subject lines.  This means that anyone who can eavesdrop on your mail stream can read your subject lines.  If your main reason for encryption is to foil casual snooping, just use subject lines as usual, but be aware that you are revealing information. Alternatively, you can use uninformative subjects like, "Encrypted message."  (An eavesdropper will be able to tell which messages are encrypted anyway, so you haven't revealed anything.)  For voluminous correspondence, where subject lines might be needed to categorize messages, and should not reveal information to eavesdroppers, you could use a code.  A subject of, "Spending weekend with Grandpa" might indicate one type of message, and "What about pizza?" another.

I've decided that, "Scroomall!  It's none of their damn' business anyway!" shall be my default subject line for encrypted mail.  Your mileage may vary.

Traffic Analysis

An adversary who can eavesdrop on your email can see with whom you correspond even if the contents of the messages remain hidden.  Sometimes inferences can be drawn from that information.  For example, if the owner of a successful private company suddenly starts communicating with investment bankers, one could speculate that the company is about to go public.  Traffic analysis countermeasures are far beyond the scope of this article, but users of encryption should be aware of the possibility that "they" know to whom you are writing, even though they can't read the messages.

It is increasingly the case that email systems use TLS/SSL encryption between client and server, and from one email server to another.  Although that makes traffic analysis more difficult, he header information of email messages is necessarily unencrypted while the message is "at rest," either on a server or at the origin or destination.  An adversary with access to an email provider's servers can read all of the header information: sender, recipients, subject, and the rest.  Of course, if the adversary can install monitoring software on the computer at the origin or destination, no part of the message is secure, even if the body is encrypted.

Digital Certificates

If Evil Eve the Eavesdropper could somehow replace Alice's public key with Eve's own, then Eve would be able to read messages intended for Alice.  We guard against that by embedding public keys in digital certificates.  A self-signed digital certificate is a digest (electronic fingerprint) of the public key and identifying data, computed using a cryptographic hash function and encrypted with the owner's private key.  Because public and private keys are cryptographic inverses of one another, anyone can compute the digest of Alice's digital certificate, then use Alice's public key (from the certificate) to decrypt the digest from the certificate, and finally compare the two.  In theory, if the two digests match, one should be able to trust the public key.  In practice, a self-signed digital certificate provides no significant protection against replacing both the public key and the encrypted fingerprint.  Self-signing does protect the certificate from tampering.

We overcome the problem that Eve could have generated a completely forged certificate by having the digital certificate signed with the private keys of one or more trusted third parties.  One approach is to use a single trusted party, the certificate authority.  The other approach, and the one employed by OpenPGP, is to have that key fingerprint signed by several third parties in whom we place varying degrees of trust.

A third party signs a certificate by computing the digest of the identifier and public key, then encrypting it with the signer's private key.  The signer's identity is added to the signature.   Anyone can find the signer's public key and check the digital signature as described above.

There is more about digests in A Little About Encryption.

 Key Signing

If a third party whom we trust has signed Alice's key, we can have a great deal of confidence that we really have Alice's key and not Eve's because changing the key would invalidate the signature.  If we don't know the person who signed Alice's key, we have a lot less trust.  Perhaps Eve has subverted the signer.

If several people have signed Alice's key, our confidence increases because Eve the Eavesdropper would have had to subvert each of them.  The more signers, the more confidence we can have, especially if one of the signers is known to us.  This creates the "web of trust" that lets us have confidence that the public keys of others have not been tampered with, and does so without the need for a central authority.

You may be asked to "sign" someone's key, or you may want to ask someone to sign yours.  To have a friend sign your key, approach the friend in person, with your name or email address and key fingerprint written on paper.  If your friend agrees to sign your key,your friend will take the paper, obtain your public key from a key server, and verify that the key fingerprint you supplied on paper patches that of the key from the key server.  If the two fingerprints match, your friend will get your key from a key server, "certify" the key as belonging to you by adding his digital signature, and send it back to the key server.

There's no need to go wild, but your key will be more trusted if at least four or five people have signed it; more is better. Try to have it signed by people who move in different circles; that will increase the probability the someone who needs your key will know someone who has signed it, or "know someone who knows someone."

A Key Signing Party 

 Since getting people who can verify each others' identity to sign each others' public keys is a Good Thing, and since socializing with like-minded people is also a Good Thing, you might want to host (or instigate) a key signing party.  You won't even need access to computers at the party.  The host prepares a list of attendees and information about their public keys and makes a copy for everyone at the party.  Attendees bring their own key information and picture IDs to the party.  Each guest checks the information for each other guest, and then later signs the keys of those whose information checks out.  The "later" part is why you do not need, and should not have, computers at the party.

There are many sets of instructions for organizing key signing parties on the web.  The best one I've found so far is the W4KWH Key Signing Party Guide.

If you host or attend a key signing party, be sure you scrupulously verify the identification and key information of everyone whose key you intend to sign.  Do not make this mistake:

Trusting Others' Certifications

Suppose Alice wants to communicate securely with Bob. She retrieves Bob's public key from a key server and  finds that it has been signed by Charles, David, Frank, and George.  Can we say more about how certain Alice can be that she really has Bob's public key than, "signed by four people?"  Yes, especially if Alice knows any of those people, or knows anyone who has signed their keys..

Alice (and you) can assign a level of trust to every key on her keyring of public keys.  This is a subjective decision; Alice (and you) get to decide.  The levels of trust are:
  1. Unknown
  2. Untrusted (known to sign public keys carelessly or maliciously; see the cartoon!)
  3. Marginally trusted (probably careful when signing public keys)
  4. Fully trusted.
Anything signed with Alice's own private key is assumed to be fully trusted; everything else is initially set to "unknown."  Alice can change the trust level of keys on her keyring.  If Charles's key is on Alice's keyring, she can set its trust to "marginally trusted" or even "fully trusted."

Given the idea of levels of trust, one can apply an algorithm to help Alice decide whether the key she has retrieved from a key server for Bob is really his.  A key is valid (i.e. trustworthy) if two conditions hold.  First, it must have been signed by "enough" trusted keys.  "Enough" means:
  1. Alice has signed it herself, or
  2. It has been signed with at least one key that is fully trusted by Alice, or
  3. It has been signed with at least three keys marginally trusted by Alice.
The second condition is that the path of signatures from Bob's key to Alice's has five or fewer steps.  That may seem very restrictive until one considers the concept of six degrees of separation.

Those are the default parameters for GnuPG; you can change the parameters to be more or less restrictive.  Levels of trust are private, and are not shared or exported when you sign someone else's public key.

Creating a Revocation Certificate 

Once a key has been uploaded to a key server, it is effectively impossible to remove.  Yet, you might want to remove your key for a number of reasons.  It might be something as scary as having your private key compromised, or as mundane as getting a new email address, which is effectively a new identity.  (You can also deal with a new email address using subkeys, which are explained in the Gnu Privacy Handbook.  Subkeys are really the right way to deal with new addresses.) Although you can't remove a key from the key servers, you can revoke it... if you have a revocation certificate. Revoking your key tells everyone it is no longer effective to use that public key.

The revocation certificate must be signed using your private key.  One of the reasons you might want to revoke a public key is that you no longer have access to the corresponding private key.  As I wrote in an earlier post, that can happen if you forget your passphrase or have a disk failure.  So, generate that revocation certificate soon after you generate your key pair.  Once you've generated a revocation certificate, do not import it.  You will do that only if you're ready to revoke the public key.  Instead, store it someplace safe.  Remember, anyone who can get access to your revocation certificate can revoke your public key.

You will need to use the command interface of GnuPG to create your revocation certificate.  Open a command window and navigate to the directory where gpg.exe is stored.  On my computer, that's
\Program Files\GNU\GnuPG.
The command line to enter is
gpg --output <key ID>.revoke.asc --gen-revoke <key ID>
Where <key ID> represents the eight hex character ID of the key for which you want to create a revocation certificate.  Here, edited slightly, is what it looked like when I created a revocation certificate for key ID 375F8696.  What I typed is in bold.

gpg --output 375f8696.revoke.asc --gen-revoke 375f8696
sec  2048R/375F8696 2013-04-07 Bob Brown <my_email>
Create a revocation certificate for this key? (y/N) y
Please select the reason for the revocation:
  0 = No reason specified
  1 = Key has been compromised
  2 = Key is superseded
  3 = Key is no longer used
  Q = Cancel
  (Probably you want to select 1 here)
  Your decision? 1
  Enter an optional description; end with empty line:
  Reason for revocation: Key has been compromised
  (No description given)
  Is this okay? (y/N) y
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
  user: "Bob Brown <my_email>"
  passphrase entered here
  2048-bit RSA key, ID 375F8696, created 2013-04-07
  ASCII armored output forced.
  Revocation certificate created.

The result will be a file called <key ID>.revoke.asc; in the example, 375F8696.revoke.asc, in the same directory where you ran the command.  Do not leave it there!  You need the revocation certificate if you lose access to your private key, which could happen if your computer is stolen or your hard disk fails.

These instructions came from the Gnu Privacy Handbook.  I recommend having a good look at it to see what else one can do with

Signing Unencrypted Messages

GnuPG can be used to add a digital signature even to messages that haven't been encrypted.  Such a digital signature makes the messages tamper-evident and provides for cryptographic authentication of the sender.  It also adds PGP headers and a base 64 encoded digital signature to the body of the message, making one's messages somewhat ugly.  There are two reasons for signing unencrypted messages.  One, of course is to provide tamper-resistent, authenticated messages.  The other, and possibly the more important one, is for it to cause recipients of such messages to say, "WTF?" and thereby open a discussion of why they, too, should be encrypting their email.  For that second reason alone, it may be worth it.

Validating (Verifying) Signed Messages

Enigmail can be configured to add digital signatures to all messages by default, even those that are not encrypted.  It can also be configured on a per-address basis.  Consider adding a digital signature to all of your email, or at least to mail sent to friends who might be amenable to encrypting their own email.

The cartoon is a little tongue-in-cheek... well, a lot tongue in cheek.  Validation of signatures is automagic if the recipient is using an email client that understands OpenPGP.  Such a client may even conceal the headers and just give a green bar or other indication that the message has been authenticated.  Someone using an email client that doesn't understand OpenPGP can still validate digital signatures.  To do so, copy the entire message, beginning with "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" and ending with "-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----" and save it to a temporary file.  It can then be validated using the Decrypt/Verify File function of Kleopatra.  (It's under the File menu.)  The recipient must have imported the sender's public key certificate.

Thunderbird Portable Edition

My laptop goes where I go, so I can deal with encrypted email just about anywhere.  If you primarily use a desktop computer and set up encryption there, it might be difficult to read or send encrypted email from elsewhere.  One solution might be Thunderbird Portable Edition.  This is Thunderbird bundled with the PortableApps launcher so that it will run from a USB flash drive.  One can install GPG and Enigmail on the same flash drive.  Using Thunderbird this way leaves no information behind on the host computer.  The Windows operating system is required.

If you set up and use Thunderbird Portable Edition, your private key will be on that flash drive; be sure to guard it well.  Consider using an encrypted flash drive.

If you use any of the PortableApps applications, please consider making a donation or buying one of their flash drives.  The software is free; the effort of making it portable is supported by donations.

Previous article: It's Time to Encrypt Your Email    Next article:A Little About Encryption

Copyright © 2013 by Bob Brown 

Creative Commons License
Using Encrypted Email by Bob Brown is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

The XKCD cartoons are used under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License.The quotation by Ken White is used by permission.